Part 2
Life afterwards
Thirteen essential systems fail on different timelines after a major earthquake. Their recovery depends on roads, fuel, power and one another.
Last reviewed
Repairs wait on fuel and roads
Generators, emergency crews and every delivery of supplies run on fuel. Fuel moves by road, and the roads are expected to be damaged or running at much reduced capacity for weeks to months.
Crews clear debris in a set order: lifeline routes first, then critical infrastructure, then major freeways and arterials, and local streets last. That order decides when a crew reaches a broken water main. Metro Vancouver’s model of a magnitude 9.0 earthquake breaks its water mains in 267 places, about 60 of them where mains cross under rivers and inlets. There are 71 of those crossings, and they are the hardest places in the system to reach.
What fails first, and what follows
In the first hours, phone networks and health care are hit, and dams have to be checked. Cell sites switch to backup power, and no rule says how long it has to last: the federal regulator opened a proceeding to set one and has not decided. About 65 per cent of Vancouver Coastal Health’s buildings are likely to be completely damaged by the shaking the current building code designs for.
Within the first week, the damage spreads to electricity, water, roads, fuel and food. In downtown Vancouver, up to two thirds of BC Hydro’s customers could be without power for several weeks, and the system could take years to fully restore. Many bridges are expected to be damaged, and each stays closed until it has been inspected. Every bridge to the airport is among them, so road access to it is expected to be cut for the first few days. In a Cascadia earthquake the United States would be hit too, and unable to send mutual aid.
Over the following weeks, sanitation, natural gas, housing and the port, airport and ferry terminals stay disrupted. Water and sewer service are expected to be disrupted for many months. Gas is the one utility that cannot be switched back on all at once: service returns building by building, once a qualified person has been inside and relit every appliance. Doing that for hundreds of thousands of customers would take several weeks.
How long each system is out
The table shows how long each system is expected to be out, in the words of the document that estimates it. Where no document gives an estimate, the table says so. That means nobody has published one, not that the system would hold up. How this site works.
For the port, airport and ferry terminals, the only study covers the Cascadia scenario and not the shallow crustal one. Safety and conflict has no restoration time at all, because after a disaster most people help one another, and theft and violence are isolated cases.
| System | Expected disruption | Felt worst |
|---|---|---|
| Communications |
| Hours |
| Electricity |
| Days |
| Water |
| Days |
| Sanitation |
| Weeks |
| Natural gas |
| Weeks |
| Transportation |
| Days |
| Port, airport and ferry terminals |
| Weeks |
| Fuel |
| Days |
| Food |
| Days |
| Dams and reservoirs |
| Hours |
| Housing |
| Weeks |
| Health care |
| Hours |
| Safety and conflict |
| Not timed |
| Where help comes from |
| Days |
Durations in the words of the documents that state them. Not an engineering assessment.
Dams and reservoirs: the 2024 safety reviews of Cleveland and Seymour Falls dams found no unsafe condition, but their published conclusions do not mention earthquakes. Seismic upgrade work at Cleveland has not started.
The systems
Communications
Cell-site backup power lasts hours to days, and no rule sets a minimum.
Electricity
Up to two thirds of downtown customers could lose power for several weeks.
Water
Breaks under rivers and inlets take the longest to repair.
Sanitation
Without running water, toilets in apartment towers stop working.
Natural gas
Restoring gas requires a visit to every affected building.
Transportation
A bridge may survive an earthquake without being usable afterwards.
Port, airport and ferry terminals
The airport model expects damage to every bridge onto Sea Island.
Fuel
A service station with full tanks and no power dispenses nothing.
Food
Fresh food depends on regular deliveries.
Dams and reservoirs
The 2024 engineering reviews do not publish an earthquake finding.
Housing
Cordons and failed utilities can keep people out of standing homes.
Health care
Most hospital buildings in the region predate the current seismic code.
Safety and conflict
Most people help one another after a disaster. Theft and violence are the exception.
Where help comes from
A coast-wide earthquake leaves fewer outside agencies able to help.
What you can do
Plan to be without water, power and a working toilet at the same time.
- Store four litres of water per person per day, pets included. That is the province’s figure, and it covers drinking and basic sanitation. Getting bulk drinking water out across the region is expected to be hard for the first four to five days.
- Find out what in your home needs electricity, including the heating and any gas appliance with an electric fan or control, and decide now what you will do without each one.
Preparing covers the rest.
Sources on this page
Numbered in the order they are cited. Each entry links back to where it is used.
- [1]ReportProvincial Earthquake Immediate Response StrategyMinistry of Emergency Management and Climate Readiness, Province of BC · 2022Open the document ↗
- [2]ReportJoint Municipal Regional Disaster Debris Management Operational PlanMetro Vancouver REAC / IPREM / CCEM · 2017Open the document ↗
- [3]ReportRegional Water Supply System Lifeline Study — Seismic Vulnerability AssessmentMetro Vancouver · 2022Open the document ↗
- [4]ReportTelecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2025-226CRTC · 2025Open the document ↗
- [5]ReportDCRRA Appendix C, Case Study 3 (Georgia Basin amplification; Kakoty & Molina Hutt, UBC) and Case Study 4 (VCH hospital portfolio; Kaur & Molina Hutt, Orr, White), plus Appendix A on method limitsEMCR / ECS, Province of BC · 2025Open the document ↗
- [6]ReportWest End Substation Project, Initial Application to the BCUC (CPCN), §2.2.1 Seismic Concerns and fn. 2BC Hydro / BCUC · 2025Open the document ↗
- [7]ReportBC Smart Infrastructure Monitoring SystemBC Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure · 2022Open the document ↗
- [8]ReportStudy of Impact and the Insurance and Economic Cost of a Major Earthquake in British Columbia and Ontario/QuébecInsurance Bureau of Canada / AIR Worldwide · 2013Open the document ↗
- [9]ReportDecision and Order C-6-25, Tilbury LNG Storage Expansion CPCN (Fung, Loski, Dennier)BC Utilities Commission · 2025Open the document ↗
- [10]Analogue eventDisaster mythology and fact: Hurricane Katrina and social attachmentJacob, Mawson, Payton and Guignard, Public Health Reports 123(5) · 2008Open the document ↗
- [11]ReportDisaster and Climate Risk and Resilience Assessment: Provincial ReportEMCR and Ministry of Energy and Climate Solutions, Province of BC · 2025Open the document ↗
- [12]ReportSeismic Risk and Risk Reduction in Existing Privately Owned Buildings, RTS 16091 (report plus Appendix A technical assessment), Micah Hilt with NRCan and UBC Civil EngineeringCity of Vancouver · 2024Open the document ↗
- [13]ReportGVWD Dam Safety Program Annual Update for 2025Metro Vancouver / GVWD, Water Services (Director, Dam Safety) · 2026Open the document ↗
- [14]ReportCapital Expenditures as of May 31, 2026Metro Vancouver / GVWD · 2026Open the document ↗
- [15]ReportEarthquake and Tsunami Preparedness GuidePreparedBC / EMCR, Province of BC · 2024Open the document ↗